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Scientic realism asserts that the methods of science, combined with the intellec-
tual powers of human beings can give us reliable knowledge of states of the world
beyond the limits of perception. Among the varieties of realism, policy realism is
based on the principle that taking plausible theories to be putative descriptions of
actual states of aairs is the best way to design experiments and to advance our
knowledge. We carve out the Umwelt from the welt by the use of our instruments
and apparatus.e key procedure in science has been and still is the invention and
testing of models—plausibility and empirical adequacy are the marks of a theory
based on a model capable of supporting policy realism.
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In this paper I propose and discuss the question whether realism is best un-
derstood as the name of an epistemological doctrine concerning the limits
of empirical knowledge, or whether it should be taken to refer to a practical
rule for the enrichment of the scope of experimental projects? In choosing
the second line of approach the idea of science as a material and discursive
practice becomes the guiding insight. It will also emerge that at the limit of
the possibility of developing a research program there is a need to adopt a
radically dierent ontology from that with which scientists have worked un-
til the 20th century. Dispositional conceptsmust replace occurrent concepts
at the “cutting edge”.
1. Basic Features of Scientic Realism
1. Human perceptual organs are used to give access to regions of the
world that exist independently of the human observers. What peo-
ple take themselves to see, hear, feel, touch, taste and so on is strongly
inuenced by conceptual presuppositions.
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2. People have learned to distinguish reliable perceptions from illu-
sions.
3. e methods of science, observation, classication, experimenta-
tion and theorising have enabled people to gain reliable knowledge
about regions of the world that are not accessible to our unaided
perceptual or manipulative powers.
4. Human intellectual powers are capable of developing concepts the
meaning of which reaches further than the limits of our perceptual
vocabulary with which such knowledge can be expressed.
For example: in the development of fundamental physics ofmatter in the era
of quantum eects the new concept of aordances is called for, about which
more later.e fact that scientic research reveals a greatmany aspects of the
natural world about which our ancestors and the creators of our languages
knew nothing means that to record and reect upon new phenomena new
meanings are required.ese are achieved by a variety of semantic processes
including analogy, metaphor and the reication of the groundings of dispo-
sitions.
1.1 Preliminaries in General Philosophy.
1. Solipsism and Realism are isomorphic—within the solipsist’s world
the distinctions that are typical of realism can be reproduced. For
example, in both one can distinguish between dreaming and wak-
ing, between observation and representation, and so on. So a realist
need not fear a collapse into radical subjectivism as a threat to a real-
ist interpretation of scientic discourse and practice. (Wittgenstein
1922)
2. What a human being can nd by experience is the result of an in-
teraction between conceptual development, sensory capacities, ap-
paratus, and experience.is point of view was worked out early in
the 19th century in detail byWilliamWhewell (1984) in his dialectic
between theories and observations.
3. is suggests that the nature of instruments and apparatus, in their
relationship to the world they are being used to explore, will be
an important factor in working out a defensible scientic realism
(Bhaskar 2008).
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1.2 Varieties of Realism
All attempts to dene ‘scientic realism’ in terms of propositional concepts
such as truth and/or verisimilitude are doomed to failure. In this discussion
I will not make yet another futile attempt to nd a “theory of truth” that will
serve to underpin the claim that the propositional content of some theories
expresses facts about a world which cannot be perceived. Scepticism about
the possibility of determining the truth of laws of indeterminate scope and
about the possibility of determining the truth of laws of indeterminate depth
(levels below the reach of perception even enhanced perception) cannot be
defeated by philosophical arguments against the idea of truth as a progres-
sive aim.is point was made forcibly by David Hume (1971, IV, 1, 28). Nei-
ther forces nor insensible corpuscles were legitimate empirical concepts.
In this discussion I will defend “policy realism”—the thesis that reading
theories and their grounding models as if they represented features of the
world beyond our perceptual powers is a defensible interpretation of sci-
entic method (Harré 1986). It will explain how scientic progress, both
positive (new things) and negative (disposing of non-existents) is possible.
Policy Realism is closely connected to Vihalemm’s Practical Realism (Vi-
halemm 2011).
1.3 Hinges
Among the philosophical tools I will use in this discussion is Wittgenstein’s
notion of a “hinge” as elaborated and rened in recent years by philosophers
whohave taken upWittgenstein’s “third period”, thewritings that include the
last section of the Philosophical Investigations (1953) andOnCertainty (1979).
According to the authors of these developments, hinge-practices are taken for
granted unexamined normative procedures, both material and conceptual
on which the “door of life” turns as they remain stable ingredients in our
form of life (Moyal-Sharrock 2004). For example the practice of consulting
old documents to distinguish true or false memory claims, say in a court
of law or in writing history is such a hinge-practice. Each hinge-practice is
paired with a propositional doppelganger, expressing the empirical content
that is presumed to be true in the use of the hinge practice. For example, the
practice of history by consulting archeological remains is paired with the
doppelganger proposition ‘e world was not created 5 minutes ago’. is
proposition is empirical and might turn out to be false—though how we
would ever know is moot. Hinge propositions are functionally like synthetic
a priori positions in the Kantian scheme.
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2. Welt and Umwelt
e great Estonian biologist and philosopher, vonUexküll (1926) introduced
the concept ofUmwelt to describe the region of the world (Welt) that is hab-
itable by the members of a certain species.e boundaries of an Umwelt are
related to the sensory capacities, food preferences, and means of locomo-
tion and so on of members of the relevant species. e Welt is a totality of
unknown extent in content, from which diverse Umwelten are appropriated
by various species of animals and plants—and people.
e Umwelt of Homo sapiens extends to the limits of what is perceiv-
able coupled with what is manipulable. Much of what we perceive we can
manipulate (Hacking 1983). We can see and feel and taste the sea and we can
extract salt from it. We can perceive features of the world that we cannotma-
nipulate, such as the planets. We can manipulate features of the world that
we cannot perceive, such as electric elds. In general these domains of the
human Umwelt intersect but do not exhaust one another. Much but not all
that is perceivable is manipulable, such as the sand on the shore and much
but not all that is manipulable is perceivable such as feeding of a camp re
with dry wood. However, galaxies or planets can be perceived but they can-
not be manipulated andmagnetic elds can bemanipulated but they cannot
be perceived.
We are ready to believe in the existence of the beings presumed to inhabit
both realms of the human Umwelt—the perceivable and the manipulable,
beyond the central region where they overlap.
e possibility of various kinds of disparities between the Umwelten of
human individuals, small groups and the human species as a whole, must
be taken into account later in this paper when we consider the way that the
humanUmwelt can grow or shrink over time.e common region I will call
the Macro-Umwelt and the various limited regions the Micro-Umwelten.
2.1 Human Umwelten
ere are twoworlds inhabited by human beingswith two species ofUmwel-
ten.
a. e physical universe: thematerial Umwelt comprises those regions
of the Welt that are available to human perception and manipula-
tion, enhanced by “engineering” advances.
b. e socio-cultural universe: the socio-cultural Umwelt comprises
those regions of the socio-cultural Welt that are available to human
beings through their skill in symbolic interactions, enhanced by the
possibility of learning the customs of exotic cultures and the lan-
guages of foreigners. Each cultural-linguistic system makes avail-
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able a dierent Micro-Umwelt that may or may not intersect with
other Micro-Umwelten.1
2.2 Boundaries
e boundaries between the Welt and various Umwelten are in constant
change, though at dierent rates at dierent times and places. e rates of
change, be it in the enlargement or the diminution of the area of an Umwelt,
at any given moment are determined by available technical resources and
conceptual capacities of the inhabitants, as well as macro environmental
changes. Explorations of the surface of the earth required technical innova-
tions in ships and navigation as well as geographical intuitions and insights.
Microscopes and telescopes enlarged the human Umwelt, and so do chem-
ical manipulations—changing the boundaries of the available compounds
and elements.
e boundaries between socio-cultural Umwelten are similarly unsta-
ble. e program of the human sciences could be thought of as a cluster of
projects that reveal features of the socio-culturalWelt—the totality of human
social formations and interactions, which are not fully included in any mu-
tually available Umwelten.is is complicated by the fact that much of both
the Welt and the Umwelten in the cultural domain is partially constructed
and so not wholly there to be found. Not only that but we give meanings
to features of the material world such as eclipses of the Sun, droughts, epi-
demics, and so on that are drawn from cultural sources.e social Umwel-
ten include fragments of material Umwelten.
e discussion in this paper is directed to the uses of the concepts ofWelt
and Umwelt in making sense of realist readings of the physical sciences.
What combination of theoretical and empirical researchmethods would
make a shi in the boundary between Umwelt andWelt possible or perhaps
mandatory?
In the natural sciences explanatory iconic models, about which more
below, present images of aspects of the Welt beyond the current concepts
of the human Umwelt. By taking at least some of these models seriously as
possible representations of hitherto unknown regions of the Welt and so as
guides to further research projects and as inspirations for the creation of new
apparatus and instruments scientic practices can expand the boundaries
of the Umwelt and at the same time remove imaginary beings, states and
processes from it. With a bolometerwe canmeasure the heat of the stars, and
with the understanding that mutation and selection in the world of animals
1 e socio-cultural Umwelt includes not only social practices, but the bodies of knowledge
that social actors draw upon in creating their daily lives. Bodies of knowledge are the
targets of research in the newly developing eld of Discursive Psychology.
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and plants are independent we delete the concept of inheritance of acquired
characteristics from the list of processes that we believe have occurred in the
past.
3. e Step to Policy Realism
Umwelt expands and contracts by the testing models as images of regions of the
Welt previously inaccessible either to perception ormanipulation, for verisimil-
itude.
is is the key to the defence of policy realism—it is reasonable to inter-
pret explanatory models as representations of possible features of the world.
What makes a model worth testing for verisimilitude, likeness to some
feature of the world that it claims to represent?e criteria can be set out in
two principles.
1. Empirical adequacy: successful prediction using the model as the
basis for a logical move is not to be understood as inductive support
for a hypothetical generalisation. Instead we should see it as pro-
viding support for the choice of a certain “law” as a prescription for
a model that when run reproduces analogues of the phenomena of
interest. For example, Dalton’s Law of Partial Pressures prescribes
a model which when run reproduces the observable behaviour of
mixtures of gases.
2. Ontological plausibility: the source of the model that is the core of
the theory being tested in phase 1 of the test is coherent with the rest
of scientic knowledge at that historical point, particularly with the
implicit ontology in play at the time.
If a model is the core of an empirically adequate theory and is coher-
ent with the rest of the science of the era then it is worth trying to create
conditions and equipment that will enable us to display the states of aairs,
processes, mechanisms etc. represented by the model in perceptual form, or
if not then in manipulable form (Aronson et al. 1998).
To elaborate and justify this line of argument we must turn to the uses
of models in science.
4. e Methodology of Model Construction
In this paper I am concerned only with iconic models, that is models as
representations of something in the natural world by means of a picturing
relation—not by the creation of a model as a symbolic formal description,
say as an algebraic formula, by means of arbitrary symbols related by se-
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mantic conventions only to their subject.2 Randommoving molecules is an
iconic model of a gas, and the formula ‘p(v − b) + a/v2 = Rt’ is a formal
model of the same gas. By itself the formal model means nothing until it is
interpreted in terms of the iconic model (Harré 2004).
4.1 Models as Analogues
As analogues models have positive, (similarities), negative (dissimilarities)
and neutral analogies with their targets or subjects.
ere must be negative and neutral analogies for the model to be a rep-
resentation and knowledge enriching device and not an empty clone. e
neutral analogy allows for a model to grow by discovery of further similari-
ties and dissimilarities betweenmodel and target by drawing on the relation
of the model to its source.e above formula (van der Waal’s equation) was
reached from the original general gas law (PV = RT) by drawing on more
and more features of the iconic model of molecules as material objects.
e Bohrmodel of the structure of a hydrogen atomwasmeant to be like
such an atom (if there are any such) in having a central positively charged
nucleus and a peripheral electron that is electrically negative. As subatomic
physics developed more elaborate atoms were imagined and more features
of the planetary basis of the model were included such as the spin of the
orbiting electrons.
e model is like its source, the planetary system, in that it consists of a
heavy core around which lighter objects orbit.
e model is unlike its source, the planetary system, in that its compo-
nents are electrically charged.
e model is indeterminate in that discrete electron orbits are neither
like nor unlike what electrons “do”, and they are unlike anything planets do.
4.2 e Source -Subject Distinction
A model is modelled on a source.
A model is a model of a subject.
a. Type 1models: source and subject are the same—for example amodel
of an architectural project.
2 A reviewer has drawn my attention to way that Charles Sanders Peirce treated all kinds of
models as iconic, including algebraic equations. is seems to me to be a mistaken inter-
pretation by Peirce, since an algebraic equation has no empirical content other than the
data from which it was originally derived. An additional act of interpretation is required
to turn ‘E = mc2 ’ into the relation between mass and energy from its from its formal
derivation from the Lorentz transformation.
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b. Type 2models: source and subject are dierent—for example a solar
system and the Bohr atom as model of atomic substructure.
4.3 Uses of Models
Type 1 models are used to control the analysis of complex phenomena to
abstract salient features and to clarify understandings. ere may be more
than one Type 1 model relevant as an analytical tool for some complex natu-
ral system. For example, a geophysical map can be based on geological strata
determined by chemical analysis or on layers determined by the fossils they
contain, or both.
Type 2 models are used to represent hitherto unobserved and so hypo-
theticalmechanisms, structures, states and process that are suggested as gen-
erators of observable phenomena. For example, type theory in chemistry
evolved into structural pictures that X ray spectroscopy enables us to take
literally as picture of hitherto unobserved features of the material world.
As a general rule Type 2 models represent structures and processes that
are not yet within the humanUmwelt, though theremay bemany such items
in the Umwelt of a certain human group at a certain time that are similar,
and provide the source for the novelties invented by theoreticians. It is this
feature that makes iconic models indispensable in the development of the
scope and depth of science. However, you might say, does not this hap-
pen with formal, mathematical models as theories? A formal, mathematical
model does not aect the boundaries of the human Umwelt unless it can be
interpreted in such a way that it can be understood to describe some feature
of the natural world, hitherto unknown. In order for such a formal model
to advance the sciences it must be interpreted by the use of an iconic model.
A mathematical model can have empirical adequacy but lacks ontological
plausibility until it is interpreted as a description of a plausible iconic model.
e Source-Model relation works well as the basis of ontological plau-
sibility in the case of the electromagnetic model of atomic structure, even
when the nature of electrons is hard to grasp in that theirmotion ismodelled
mathematically and formally by the Schrödinger equation, or in the context
ofmolecular structure as linear functions of several such equations. Our ini-
tial grasp of the Bohr model makes use of well established classical physical
principles, laws of electromagnetism and laws of mechanics. In chemistry
we create the quantum numbers by quantizing classical structures, e.g. spin
up and spin down. But not always—just for the most part. Sometimes in
the sciences we nd that there is nothing in our everyday world, or even in
prior scientic developments that can provide a convincing source for an
interpretative model. Models are images of possible worlds constrained by
the principle of verisimilitude we have described above.
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In short, iconic model making and testing is the only coherent method
for realising the program of realism—that is revealing and exploring aspects
of the world beyond the range of human abilities of perception and manip-
ulation. In an important insight we have come to realise that pieces of ap-
paratus are also to be treated as models of aspects of reality when we come
interpret the results of experimenting with them.
5. Policy Realism
It is rational to adopt the policy of creating iconic models and testing them
for the degree to which they represent hitherto unrevealed features of the
natural world.e fact that some iconic models fail the “verisimilitude test”
is an argument in favour of policy realism. It made sense to test them for
verisimilitude.e o-cited example of ‘phlogiston’ as a coremodel in chem-
istry shows the importance of the verisimilitude test. Of course when a test
succeeds the iconic model is very quickly absorbed into the ontology of sci-
ence as a proper part of the Umwelt. Tectonic plates and genes have joined
galaxies and capillaries in almost everyone’s world—while the disease caus-
ing “mal arias” and the canals on Mars have vanished.
Policy realism is a very simple claim: the history of science displays the
ecacy of the adoption of policy realism by the scientic community. It was
not always without resistance—whenever the progress of science in reveal-
ing hitherto unobserved phenomena has stalled positivism reappears. at
philosophical position bids us retreat to the realm of observable phenomena
as the only sure ground for scientic truth (Harré 1986).
6. Elaborations
Can we extend the Policy Realism argument to cases in which the subject
of the explanatory iconic model cannot be revealed to human perceivers?
Robert Boyle’s argument for the reality of the corpuscularian ontology that
he proposed for the foundations of his chemical work suggests a possible
extension of Policy Realism (Boyle 1666).
To show that a certain kind of imperceptible entity exists, Boyle pro-
posed that we demonstrate that a certain kind of manipulation of an entity
of that kind has an observable outcome that is not of the same category as
the entities that the manipulation aects. He carried out a number of exper-
iments in which he tried to limit the manipulations to which he subjected
his experimental material to mechanical actions only, such as dividing and
compounding. For example, by crushing a green emerald he produced a
white powder. e “stu” changed its visible appearance as the result of a
manipulation that aected only the “bulk, gure texture and motion of the
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insensible parts”, none of which are colours—in short a mechanical action
resulted in a change in a non-mechanical property.
If we want to change the properties of a material stu, then adopting
the policy that we presume that it is actually characterised only by its “me-
chanical” properties, and the rest are secondary, requires us to perform only
mechanical actions on it.
In recent times the same principle has been put to work in a great many
experimental programs.e Stern-Gerlach experiment involves a change of
orientation of an image by means of a magnetic manipulation that could af-
fect only the orientations of the spin axes of the silver ions passing through
a magnetic eld. A non-magnetic phenomenon is brought about by a mag-
netic manipulation which could aect only the magnetic attributes of the
imperceptible substrate. e change of orientation of the image was not an
eect of the magnetic manipulation of it but of the imperceptible magnetic
features of silver ions.
7. Aordances
Inevitably the methods of iconic modelling and testing run out. Physics
and chemistry have reached depths of ne-grained analysis of substances
and their reactions that resist representations by iconic models. Indeed, this
should be no surprise, because it is not only likely but probable that the ne
structure of the universe as well as its macrostructure will not be similar to
the world that our senses and manipulative powers reveal to us (Cartwright
1986).
While still within the realmof a possible extension of the humanUmwelt,
a fruitful way of expanding the reach of dispositional concepts developed in
the seventeenth century. Some attributes of material things are displayed in
all circumstances and to all the senses. Locke (1972) called these the “primary
qualities”.ey were picked out by Galileo (1957) as attributes that could be
studied in his new science of mechanics. Typically, at that time, shape, size,
number, motion, and solidity featured among the primary qualities. Galileo,
Locke and others realised that colours and tastes were not displayed by ama-
terial thing at all times and places, but only when a human being interacted
with a coloured thing and only in certain circumstances. is something is
orange if a human being has an orange visual experience when looking at
a certain fruit in a good light. us what colours we see is conditional on
certain contingencies being realised. ese are secondary or dispositional
attributes (Mumford 1998).
An entity has a disposition even when not displaying it. What is the
permanent grounding of that disposition? We surely have no trouble with
the idea that there are features of the surface of a solid that dierentially
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reect light so that the surface looks red to a human being. ese features
are well within the range of the scientic Umwelt. What is more the display
of this disposition is a stable feature of the surface and is displayed to a variety
of interaction processes, all of which involve light of certain wavelength. By
developing models of the relevant surface features a simple Policy Realism
argument supports the idea that these features should be taken to be real to
shape further researches.
But what if we were to interact with the surface in one way to yield say
a blue appearance, and in another way to yield a red appearance? Would we
have to violate the principle of non-contradiction and assert that the same
surface was red and blue all over? Surely we would put the dierence in the
appearance of the surface down a dierence in the way we interacted with
it. It aords a blue appearance to this manipulation and a red appearance to
thatmanipulation and it is amistake to try to unify these aordances beyond
this apparently preliminary step. Most people, I suppose, would say that
we should undertake research to try to nd out what it is about the surface
that it reacts in this seemingly contradictory way.eremust be a common
feature behind the seeming diversity. Of course there is no necessity about
this “must”.
Whenwe turn to the comparable situation in subatomic physicswe reach
an impasse. We can go no further than aordances, dispositions of appara-
tus/observer-Welt complexes, from which neither component can be de-
tached. “Electrons” appear as particulate phenomena under one kind of
manipulation and as wave-like phenomena under another type of manip-
ulation.ere is nothing that electrons are in addition to these displays.
7.1 Realism in reality
To complement the Policy Realism conception of scienticmethod, wemust
pass on to a Metaphysical Realism of aordances (Gibson 1967). ese are
potentialities that are permanent but conditional attributes of apparatus-
Welt complexes, not of the Welt alone. Only if the apparatus/observe could
be detached from the Welt could we restore the old conception of scientic
realism dened in terms of the empirical factuality of the propositions of at
least some theories.
e link between the two faces of scientic realism is via the principle
that dispositions are grounded in occurrent properties of the subject of our
researches. Perhaps some day an iconic model that is empirically adequate
and ontologically plausible will be invented to represent those occurrent
properties of the Welt that ground what we know only as aordances.
But as far as we are concerned, in the last analysis dispositions are
grounded in permanent potentialities.e deep ontological project for phi-
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losophy of science is to dene and defend an ontology of potentialities and
powers for which we cannot imagine a stable and persisting grounding, that
is the technique of creating iconic models of the unobservable foundations
of dispositions must come to an end.
8. Conclusion
ere have been many interpretations of realism. I believe that by attend-
ing to scientic practice and the ways that scientic representation of the
world has ebbed and owed, we can see that there is one form of realism
that both makes sense conceptually and is defensible as a foundation for sci-
entic practice. e realism I hope I have made tenable is not a doctrine
concerned with the truth of hypotheses, but with the plausibility of models
and rationale of experimental manipulations.
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